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Destroying the

Mother

of All Arsenals”

cAPTUReD eNeMy AMMUNITION OPeRATIONS IN IRAq
A Russian FAB-5000 M54 high-explosive bomb in the vicinity of Zakho, northern Iraq (August 2004).
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ticle gives a first-hand view of the
perils in Iraq.
by COL George Zahaczewsky Ret. U.S. Army

O

n 20 March 2003, United States and Coalition
Forces crossed the border into Iraq, initiating
ground combat operations during Operation
Iraqi Freedom. Almost immediately, they encountered
vast stockpiles of conventional Iraqi munitions. Much
of the ammunition was in pristine condition, while large
amounts of other ordnance had been looted, scavenged
or damaged during combat operations. It soon became
apparent that a major effort would be required to secure
and dispose of these stockpiles.

Assessing and Managing the Problem
The discovery of these “ammo dumps” was not unexpected. Preparations to deal with
captured enemy ammunition were part of the initial campaign planning for Operation
Iraqi Freedom that started in October 2002. What was not appreciated until much later
in 2003 was the scope of the problem. Ground commanders quickly put together plans
and manpower in an attempt to secure or destroy the enormous caches of ammunition
their units were encountering. These well-intentioned efforts would eventually produce
mixed results and, in some instances, amplify the problem.
Increased awareness but uncertainty of the magnitude of the captured enemy ammunition (CEA) problem resulted in the United States Army Corps of Engineers requesting
to conduct an assessment in June/July 2003 to determine if their existing munitions remediation programs could bring aid. Specifically, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7)
sought assistance in the munitions collection process, the transportation of the ordnance
to disposal areas and the operation of the demolition sites themselves.
Due to the perceived urgency of the situation, CJTF-7 wanted capability in place
within 30 days of the assessment to begin reducing or replacing military personnel
and equipment engaged in the CEA mission (now renamed the Coalition Munitions
Clearance program). Combined Joint Task Force 7—the “customer”—wanted the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers and its contractors to provide a “cradle-to-grave” service that
could eventually be transferred over to Iraqi authorities.
Funding was provided to the Corps of Engineers on 28 July 2003 to commence
CEA operations. USACE awarded several contracts on 8 Aug. 2003—one to the Parsons
Corporation (Pasadena, Calif.) for $80 million (U.S.) to provide the logistical support for
the overall effort, and three contracts worth $67 million each to the following unexploded ordnance contractors: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technologies (Knoxville, Tenn.),
Tetra Tech-Foster Wheeler (Pasadena, Calif.), and USA Environmental, Inc. (Tampa,
Fla.). The scope of work for the contractors included the following requirements:
• Manage ammunition supply points/collection points (ASP/CP).
• Perform demolition of unserviceable munitions.
• Perform demolition of priority munitions as identified by CJTF-7.
• Perform transportation of CEA from caches to ammunition supply points/collection points or demolition areas as required and transport prepared demolition
loads of CEA from ASP/CP to the demolition area.
• Perform surface unexploded ordnance clearances, booby trap clearances, disablement of unconventional warfare devices, site investigations, evaluations and responses in support of the CEA mission.
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accidents (which claimed the lives of 6,000 Vietnamese in
The Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System
the first half of 2005 alone). Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
(CMVIS) has proven to be an effective tool in monitordo have among the highest numbers of mine and UXO
ing casualties and ensuring full reporting nationwide. Laos,
survivors in the world, but most of these were injured
which also has a national program with significant internaduring or immediately after conflicts that have now been
tional assistance, will implement a similar system, tentaover for decades. In Vietnam especially, the population of
tively titled LUMVIS, in late 2005 or early 2006.
mine/UXO survivors is aging, posing a new set of health
Surprisingly, given its size and level of development,
challenges for government agencies and non-governmental
Vietnam remains the most difficult of the three countries
organizations involved in their care.
in which to gather and share information. The challenge in
Nevertheless, there is a compelling case for continuing
Vietnam is how to expand successful models of cooperato collect information and provide assistance to new viction in several central provinces to other parts of the countims as well. First, there are still significant numbers of new
try that are also heavily affected by UXO and landmines,
deaths and injuries each year; since 2000, these have averparticularly along the south-central coast and in the central
aged approximately 800 per year in Cambodia (with full
highlands. A successful, proactive casualty information
reporting), 200 in Vietnam and 100 in Laos (with incomsystem need not be top-heavy or bureaucratic, but does
plete reporting). Cambodia ranks no. 3 or no. 4 worldwide
require central-level support, assured funding, and intein reported casualties, Vietnam around no. 10 and Laos
gration with existing health and disability data sources. If
between no. 15 and 20, depending on the year. Each cathese objectives can be achieved in Cambodia and Laos,
sualty affects not only the individuals involved, but also
they are certainly within Vietnam’s capacity as well.
their families and communities, frequently with devastatTo date, international donor funding for mine action and
ing effects on family finances through medical bills, transvictim assistance has been spread quite unevenly among the
portation costs and lost income. Thus, while longer-term
three countries. Cambodia has received an average of $20
survivors may have adapted to their injuries, new survivors
million (U.S.) per year over the last five years, or roughly $2
and their families, as well as the families of those killed by
per capita. Laos has received $5 million annually, around
mines and UXO, face immediate costs and challenges.
$1 per capita. Vietnam has averaged $5–10 million, or
Second, the historical circumstances of the Indochinese
about $0.10 per capita. This discrepancy appears likely to
conflict offer clear moral reasons for increased assistance.
continue. For instance, Australia announced in July 2005
The U.S. government and NGOs as representatives of the
that it will provide $57 million for mine clearance and vicAmerican people have a particular
responsibility, given that the vast
majority of remaining lethal ordAmong the populations most at risk are
nance is of U.S. origin, certainly
the poorest, ethnic minority groups and
in Laos and Vietnam, and also in
eastern and central Cambodia.
those living in remote areas—which are
Among the populations most at
often overlapping categories.
risk are the poorest, ethnic minority groups and those living in
remote areas—which are often
overlapping categories. Indeed, mines and UXO form one
tim assistance in the southeast Asia region over the next five
of the obstacles these groups face toward equitable, sustainyears. Reports indicate the majority of this funding will be
able development together with national majorities.
sent to Cambodia and Laos, though Vietnam will also be
What does this analysis suggest for mine action proconsidered. There are doubtless political as well as operagrams and the international donor community? First,
tional reasons for donors’ funding decisions, but given the
reduction of risk—not area cleared or numbers of ordsimilarities in UXO contamination, tampering and scrap
nance—should become the primary objective of all mine/
metal activities and risk profiles, a more regionally balanced
UXO action activities. In most situations, given limited
approach would seem warranted.
resources, this means foregoing expensive site-clearance
The regional workshop on mine/UXO risk education
operations in favor of mobile explosive ordnance removal
described above offers one model of increased cooperation
and small-scale, community-level clearance. Many internaacross national boundaries without high levels of bureautional agencies are already taking steps in this direction. A
cracy or organizing costs. Other activities currently being
subsequent step, again being pioneered by several existing
implemented include multi-country research projects, site
operators, is the formation of UXO-specific operating provisits from one country to another, exchange of experiences
cedures, rather than simply applying anti-personnel mine
within international organizations working in more than
terminology and techniques to what is in most places a disone country in the region and formation of informal parttinctly different problem. This applies as strongly to mine
nerships among national NGOs, who may in some cases
risk education programs.
receive funds from the same external donor(s). Of course,
The regional workshop in Siem Reap also recommendintergovernmental cooperation remains necessary and bened closer cooperation in MRE and mine clearance among
eficial as well. The more information publicly shared and
the Mekong subregion and neighboring countries, with
the more stakeholders from various sectors participate fully
specific emphasis on accurate data on mine/UXO conin creative problem solving, the more quickly Cambodia,
Laos and Vietnam will move toward becoming a minetamination and casualties. Where information is lacking
and UXO-risk-free region in the future.
or inadequate, additional field surveys and mine marking
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104.
should be conducted to better target MRE interventions.

• Provide security for ASP/CP, transportation operations, demolition areas and living areas as needed.
• Perform minor construction at demolition areas and
ASP/CP as required to support the CEA mission.
• Perform the above objectives at multiple sites in
separate geographic areas simultaneously.
Contractors and USACE personnel began mobilizing
immediately following the contract award, and advance
parties arrived in Iraq on 28 Aug. 2003. During this time
period, a decision was made to centralize CEA operations
in Baghdad, alongside the CJTF-7 Engineer Cell (C-7) at
Camp Victory near Baghdad International Airport. It was
further decided that field operations would be based in six
former regional Iraqi ammunition depots. Tetra Tech was
tasked with establishing operations in the southern part
of Iraq, while EOD Technologies occupied two locations
in the central part of the country. USA Environmental
set up its operations at two sites north of Baghdad—
one in the Sunni Triangle and one south of Mosul. The
initial mission objectives for this contractor workforce
were the following:
• Reduce and eventually replace active military forces with USACE and contractor assets.
• Provide “cradle-to-grave” CEA support services.
• Maximize use of Iraqi labor and assets.
• Be self-sufficient by January 2004
• Facilitate transfer of operations to the Iraqis
Munitions disposal commenced with EOD
Technologies conducting a symbolic demolition operation on 11 Sept. 2003, followed by USAE destroying
30 SA-7 Strela man-portable surface-to-air missiles on
20 Sept. 2003. Since that time, munitions disposal operations—“demo shots”—have been conducted several
days a week at the six sites. Depending on weather conditions and local labor, demo shots sometimes exceeded
150 tons per site.
Contracting Iraqi labor forces to assist in sorting,
storing and destroying ammunitions increased the production capacity of each site significantly. Often the
Iraqi laborers worked at these depots at tremendous personal risk from insurgent threats.
Types of Munitions
CEA contractors in Iraq found stockpiles consisting of every conceivable type of ammunition—from sea
mines and naval ordnance in the south of the country to
small arms, hand grenades, landmines, artillery and tank
ammunition, rockets, and guided missiles all across the
country. Much of this ammunition was virtually new,
while large quantities were unserviceable and exhibited
varying degrees of deterioration. An estimated 65 percent
of the ammunition would require demilitarization due
to its condition.
Several “surprises” confronted CEA contractors when
they entered the storage sites; many contractors were dismayed at the age and types of munitions encountered.
Some of Saddam Hussein’s ordnance stores contained
ammunition dated from 1944. For example, a large
stockpile of bombs discovered in northern Iraq contained some FAB-5000 M54, 5,000-kilogram bombs,
aerially-delivered munitions deployed only from Tu16 and Tu-95 bombers, which were not found in the
Iraqi inventory.

Another eye-opener for contractors was the large
number of countries that had supplied Saddam’s arsenal—including Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, France,
Italy, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden
and the former Yugoslavia. Munitions from at least 19
nations were uncovered during the inventories of the
depots and caches.
Although the CEA depots established an extremely
productive routine, the task confronting the 50 UXO
contractors at each site was formidable. In October 2003,
Coalition Forces reported they had located 6,444 munitions caches, of which 682 remained to be removed or
destroyed. Furthermore, over 100 of the remaining sites
were deemed to be large (i.e., 100 munitions storage bunkers or warehouses in each). Coalition Forces recovered
the cache sites and delivered the munitions to the regional
depots for storage or destruction. Beginning in December
2003, CEA contractors accompanied by either military
units or private armed security forces ventured out from
their depots and destroyed cache sites in place or relocated the ordnance to their depots for storage pending future disposal. Between September 2003 and April 2004,
the contractor workforce (which by then also included
Environmental Consulting Corporation of Burlingame,
Calif., and Zapata Engineering of Charlotte, N.C.) secured over 87,000 tons and destroyed almost 220,000
tons of munitions.
Risk to Personnel
All this work was accomplished at considerable personal
jeopardy to personnel. The most significant threat currently
hindering all reconstruction efforts is a lack of security. CEA
contractors were most at risk while traveling between sites.
These movements were most often conducted in ground
vehicle convoys. While traveling in convoy, the contractors were usually escorted by either military personnel or
armed private security forces. Regardless, insurgent forces
launched attacks and ambushes against these convoys. The
most common methods of attack were roadside improvised
explosive devices and small arms fire. Occasionally, the
convoys would be attacked by vehicle-borne IEDs. As of
the writing of this article, five CEA contractors have been
killed in such attacks.1–5
To counter the threat of attack, Parsons Corporation
bought factory-armored Ford Excursions; however,
USACE encouraged them to purchase mine-resistant vehicles from South Africa. Mechem and Regis Trading were
contracted to provide refurbished Casspirs and Mambas
(respectively) to transport UXO and security personnel
from site to site. As of the writing of this article, over
40 contractors involved in CEA operations have survived
death or serious injury from IEDs and small arms fire due
to the protection afforded by the Casspirs, Mambas and
armored Excursions.
Indirect-fire weapons such as rockets and mortars
are another form of insurgent attack. Many attacks
mimic tactics employed in Afghanistan, where rockets
are fired from improvised launchers with some incorporating a time-delay firing device to allow the insurgents
to escape any Coalition counterfire. These attacks were
common; between October 2003 and September 2004,
Camp Victory (where the CEA operation was based) was
struck 18 times.

One final, less frequent method of attack against CEA
operations was direct assault against a worksite, and only
one site endured a sustained ground attack by insurgent
forces. On 10 April 2004, a large CEA cache site south
of Mosul was attacked by a force of approximately 12 insurgents firing 57-mm rockets, rocket-propelled grenades
and machine guns. The ensuing firefight lasted about 45
minutes, wounding one American and two Kurds. Exact
casualties to the attacking force are unknown.

The F-350 Ford pickup truck in which three security subcontractors died
when the vehicle was struck by an IED consisting of an artillery projectile
(25 April 2004)

Partially disassembled Russian 100-mm high-explosive anti-tank
projectiles discovered with both the copper shape charge cone and the
explosives removed (October 2003).

A Casspir mine-resistant vehicle after it was impacted by a vehicleborne IED in the Sunni Triangle (December 2004)
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Safety Considerations
It should come as no surprise that safety is a crucial
issue when managing munitions and explosives. While
conducting CEA operations, particular hazards were
encountered when personnel were exposed to propellant, loose mortar fuses and munitions containing white
phosphorous. The following comments are intended as
“lessons learned” to promote a better understanding of
munitions disposal and provide information related to
safety in mine and UXO clearance operations. Hopefully,
the newly elected government in Iraq will lead to a more
stable and secure environment, allowing humanitarian
and relief organizations to return. As these new officials
travel about Iraq, they will be confronted with the hazards
from explosive remnants of war.
Although thought by many as a relatively small hazard,
propellant from artillery and tank ammunition proved to
be a source of several incidents during operations in Iraq.
These occurrences were due to the scavenged munitions
storage areas that contained loose and scattered propellant. The stabilizer in the propellant deteriorated and
rendered the material extremely susceptible to the high
temperatures in the country. Several incidents of spontaneous combustion occurred that resulted in personnel
injuries and property loss.
Several types of foreign mortar fuses proved especially
sensitive to handling, whether they were loose or packaged. One incident resulted in the death of an Iraqi laborer when he mishandled a loose fuse and it detonated.
Subsequently, CEA contractors were instructed to use
extreme care when handling any variety of mortar fuses
that did not have a positive safety pin blocking the firing
mechanism.
While propellant and mortar fuses are not normally
considered to be overly dangerous ordnance items, white
phosphorous has always been known to be an extremely
hazardous item to manage. Its inherent nature, combined
with the high temperatures in Iraq, which liquefied the
material during daylight working hours, prompted a
review of safety procedures but, unfortunately, was not
enough to prevent at least one serious incident.
Adding to the inherent munitions hazards were many
well-intentioned attempts to assist in the reduction of
ammunitions scattered throughout the country. Many
improperly trained combat forces attempted to destroy
munitions stores by a procedure called “drop and pop”—
an explosive charge was quickly assembled, ignited and
randomly placed (or thrown) into an ammunition storage
structure. The resulting explosion would destroy approximately 20 percent of the munitions, but the remainder
would be scattered throughout the area, presenting a formidable UXO cleanup problem. Additionally, one wellmeaning organization attempted to destroy stockpiles of

A typical ordnance disposal operation depicting the placement of munitions, donor
material and plastic explosive initiation
charges (December 2003)

Turkish trucks destroyed by insurgents at a
rest stop south of Mosul. The trucks were
scheduled to pick up CEA at a remote
cache site (April 2004).

A looted ammunition storage magazine
south of Mosul (October 2003).
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Environmental Threats
The environment also poses hazards to those not familiar with the area. As most would expect, the temperature
in Iraq during the summer months can be extremely dan-

A typical “demo shot” at one of the USA Environmental regional CEA
depots. This particular shot disposed of approximately 175 tons of CEA.
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gerous, particularly to personnel working outdoors dealing
with explosives, propellants and metal objects. During July
and August, average daily temperatures can range from
110 to 125 degrees Fahrenheit (43 to 52 degrees Celsius).
Propellant becomes very unstable at these temperatures,
metal-cased ordnance becomes extremely hot to handle
without gloves, and in some instances, explosives in munitions begin to soften and exude. Large amounts of water
were essential in CEA operations during the hottest part of
the year, not only for hydration, but also in the event of a
leakage of white phosphorous munitions.
Another environmental factor to contend with in
Iraq is leishmaniasis, which is an infection in both humans and animals transmitted by sand flies (not fleas).
Between August 2002 and February 2004, at least 522
cases of leishmaniasis were reported among U.S. military personnel who had served in southwest and central
Asia. While treatment is available for this disease, it is
far less painful and inconvenient to use N, N-diethylm-toluamide (DEET) lotion or permethrin repellent to
avoid being bitten by a sand fly.
Other environmental factors to contend with in Iraq
are snakes and scorpions. There are five types of poisonous snakes indigenous to the country, several of which
have venom that is fatal to humans. Of relevance to CEA
operations is the fact that both snakes and scorpions are
fond of shading themselves in stacks of munitions both
outdoors and in ammunition bunkers and warehouses.
No fatalities have occurred as a result of encounters,
but there have been instances in which workers have required medical assistance after a scorpion sting.
Logistics
Prior to the current conflict, the Iraqi infrastructure
was well-established with an extremely capable road
network. Many supplies were shipped in from Kuwait,
as well as some from Jordan as the intensity of the insurgency increased. The danger of transporting supplies
that were obviously destined for Coalition Forces or civilian contractors created a very tenuous supply system.
Many Iraqi, Turkish and Pakistani truckers were killed,
injured or scared away because they were aiding in the
reconstruction of Iraq in the post-Saddam era. This situation has made supplying CEA operations a formidable
challenge.
Much has been written and discussed about the
amount of ammunition that has not been secured
in Iraq; however, little has been mentioned about the
civilian CEA contractors who have accomplished a task
never before attempted under fire. Their efforts have removed thousands of potential IEDs and weapons from
the hands of the insurgents, protecting Coalition Forces
and innocent Iraqis who simply want to live free from
the oppressive Hussein regime.
In addition, by undertaking the CEA mission, the
U.S. government has demonstrated its support in eliminating the hazards of explosive remnants of war. The
United States will undoubtedly continue in this role as it
moves forward in implementing the State Department’s
new Weapons Removal and Abatement Services contract.
These U.S. efforts will continue to properly dispose of
explosive hazards and in the process protect not only innocent civilians, but also the global environment.
See “References and Endnotes,” page 104
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ammunition but unfortunately spread almost 50 pounds
of toxic material over the demolition area due to depleted
uranium in the missile fragmentation warheads.
When properly trained and experienced personnel
are utilized in munitions disposal operations, munitions
with unique hazards can be identified and separated
for future disposition. During CEA operations in Iraq,
contractors destroyed on average approximately 1 ton
of assorted explosive ordnance with properly positioned
donor material and one block of C4 explosives (1.25
pounds).
Finally, another organization complicated the securing and disposal of ordnance by instructing local
Iraqis on how to disassemble certain munitions to recover the valuable components, such as brass rotating
bands, copper shape-charge cones and, in some cases,
the explosive material. This was done to start a “cottage
industry” in order to provide a source of income for unemployed Iraqis. The precious metal was then sold to
scrap dealers.

Hidden

Killers
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cent of those are considered highimpact communities.1
By Khair M. Sharif [ Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan ]

O

ver 20 years of war have not only destroyed
Afghanistan’s rural and urban infrastructure
but also scattered landmines and unexploded
ordnance throughout the country in urban and commercial areas, towns, roads, irrigation systems and canals, and farms and grazing land.
These hidden killers are an obstacle to resettlement
for the millions of internally displaced persons and returning refugees. UXO denies access to farm and grazing
land, shelter, and water, and prevents the rehabilitation
of infrastructure critical to Afghanistan’s development.
To date, the qualit y efforts by the Mine Action
Programme for A fghanistan have accomplished
the following:
• Survey of over 377 square kilometres2 of highimpact mined area and 608 square kilometres of
former battlefields
• Clearance of 315 square kilometres of high-impact
mine-contaminated land and over 636 square kilometres of battle area clearance
• Delivery of mine risk education to almost 14.8
million people by direct or indirect measures
• Provision of technical refresher and management
training to over 6,700 MAPA staff members

An Afghan deminer clearing a collapsed, landmine-contaminated residential area.

If we look at the summary impact of the above
achievement, MAPA has made a remarkable contribution toward the following:
• Increasing food production, which has improved
health and quality of life
• Increasing repatriation process, which has reduced external aid required to support refugees
and IDPs
• Reducing casualties and fatalities, which improves
the safety and security of Afghan families
• Increasing access for emergency, rehabilitation
and development projects through clearance of
access roads and clearance of areas in preparation for subsequent assistance projects
• Increasing employment opportunities within the
commercial sector through increased national
productivity as well as for employees within
mine action non-governmental organizations
• Integrating more than 700 newly demobilised
ex-combatants into MAPA as a part of the “Mine
Action for Peace” initiative, done in direct collaboration with the government of Afghanistan
Despite the significant achievements summarised
above, according to the Landmine Impact Survey, there
are 2,368 impacted communities (about 8 percent of
the estimated 33,000 communities in the country),
of which 281 are high-impact (12 percent), 480 are
medium-impact (20 percent) and 1,607 are low-impact
(68 percent).1
The Mine Action Program for Afghanistan
comprises the United Nations Mine Action Centre
for Afghanistan and its area offices in seven different geographical regions of the country, as well as

A deminer marks the safe lane after
its clearance.
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Iraq.” The Oregonian.
5. Zeleny, Jeff. (2 Nov, 2005) “Obama-Lugar Proposal Targets Stockpiles of Conventional Weapons.” Chicago Tribune. Accessed Nov. 9, 2005.
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0511020221nov02,1,1921189.story?ctrack=1&cset=true.

Hidden killers in Afghanistan, Sharif [ from page 20 ]
endnotes
1. This information is in the UNMAS Annual Report, 2004. Visit http://www.mineaction.org/; accessed Nov. 30, 2005.
2. One square kilometre is approximately 0.386 square mile.
3. Afghanistan has also been a signatory of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 1981. For more information, visit
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument; accessed Nov. 30, 2005.

Observations on Recent changes in Northwest cambodia’s Mine/UXO Situation, Simmonds, et al. [ from page 24 ]
endnotes
1. L1S is an abbreviation for Level One Survey that is commonly used in Cambodia. This is not to be confused with LIS (Landmine Impact Survey), which is in common use in
most other parts of the world.
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2. Bottomley, Ruth. (2001) Returning life to field and forest: Mine clearance by villagers in Cambodia. Journal of Mine Action, 5.1 p.13.
http://www.maic.jmu.edu/journal/5.1/Focus/Ruth_Bottom/bottom.html. Accessed Nov. 22, 2005.
3. Bottomley, Ruth. (Dec. 31, 2003). Crossing the Divide: Landmines, Villagers and Organizations. http://www.prio.no/page/preview/preview/9429/40814.html.
Accessed Nov. 22, 2005.
4. Fleisher, Michael L. (2005) Informal Village Demining in Cambodia: An Operational Study. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/Informal_Village_Demining.pdf.
Accessed Nov. 22, 2005.

The War Goes On, Vosburgh [ from page 27 ]
endnotes
1. In the Untied States, this conflict is referred to as the Vietnam War.
2. Vietnamese Ministry of Defense Demining Command and The Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICO/BOMICEN).

claiming the Future, Sisavath [ from page 29 ]
endnotes
1. Mennonite Central Committee Web site, http://www.mcc.org/clusterbomb/report/laos_appendix.html. Accessed Nov. 15, 2005.
2. U.S. Bombing Records in Laos, 1964–1973. Congressional Record—Senate, May 14, 1975 (p. 14,266).
3. Handicap International Belgium. “Living with UXO—Final Report on the National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR.” 1997.
4. 1 square kilometre is equal to about 0.386 square mile.
5. The Safe Path Forward 2003–2013. April 2004. http://www.undplao.org/UXO%20stuff/Stratplan%20Res%20EngFINAL.pdf. Accessed Nov. 15, 2005.
6. 1 hectare equals approximately 2.5 acres.

Developing Alternatives: The Locality Demining Model in cambodia, Leighton [ from page 35 ]
endnotes
1. Richard Moyes in his report, Tampering: Deliberate Handling and Use of Live Ordnance in Cambodia (MAG, Handicap International-Belgium, Norwegian People’s Aid, 2004),
recognises that deliberate handling occurs amongst the most vulnerable families with the least traditional economic opportunities such as generation of income through livestock
or land ownership. For online text of this report see http://www.mag.org.uk/magtest/cambodia/Tampering.pdf.
2. Review of the locality demining model was undertaken by Pia Walgren for MAG.
3. As observed by MAG Cambodia’s technical operations manager, Gary Fenton.
4. See work undertaken on village demining by Ruth Bottomley, HI-B. http://www.handicapinternational.be/downloads/SpontaneousDeminingInitiatives.pdf,
accessed Dec. 13, 2005.

Afghanistan LIS, Fruchet [ from page 38 ]
endnote
1. A Landmine Impact Survey, or LIS, is a community-based national survey that measures the extent of the impact of the landmine problem in a country, based on the number of
recent victims, socio-economic blockages and type of munitions.

USAID’s Perspective: The Importance of Social and economic Developing Strategies for Humanitarian Mine Action, Feinberg
[ from page 41 ]
endnotes
1. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
2. The Leahy War Victims Fund works on behalf of civilian victims of war and people living with disabilities. See
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/the_funds/lwvf/index.html for more information. Last updated May 5, 2005. Accessed Oct. 21, 2005.
3. Learn more about the United States International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics at http://www.usispo.org/. Accessed Oct. 21, 2005.

Mine Action and Development, Turcotte [ from page 43 ]
endnotes
1. From the 2004 Nairobi Declaration by States Parties to the Ottawa Convention.
2. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. Ottawa, Canada. Sept. 18, 1997.
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
3. Landmine Monitor Report 2005. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. http://www.icbl.org/lm/2005/findings.html.
4. These individuals are often called landmine survivors. For a complete definition, see http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/intro/survivor, accessed Dec. 2, 2005.
5. On Sept. 18, 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 55/2, the United Nations Millennium Declaration. At the United Nations Millennium Summit, world
leaders agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination against
women. Placed at the heart of the global agenda, they are now called the Millennium Development Goals. The Summit’s Millennium Declaration also outlined a wide range of
commitments in human rights, good governance and democracy. See http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
6. World Bank. “Landmine Contamination: A Development Imperative,” Social Development Note No. 20, October 2004. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit.
7. Information on the Geneva Conventions can be found at http://www.genevaconventions.org/. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.
8. Information on the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate
Effects can be found at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/500?OpenDocument. Accessed Nov. 4, 2005.

Integrated Mine Action: A Rights-Based Approach in cambodia, campbell [ from page 45 ]
endnote
1. The Millennium Development Goals are eight goals adopted by the government to eradicate poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality,
reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/Aids, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental stability and develop a global partnership for development,
all by 2015. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. Accessed Nov. 1, 2005.

How can economists contribute to Mine Action, Marsh [ from page 51 ]
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